



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE.

In view of the rapid progress made in recent years in Psychology, as evidenced by the continuous and ever-increasing output of books, monographs, articles and journals covering a wide range of subjects, it is worthy of note that practically nothing has been written upon our most common, everyday mental experiences, such as hope, disappointment, despair, modesty and shame, arrogance and pride, patience and endurance, friendship and loyalty, courage, ambition and very many others. Only one writer, a German,¹ has made a careful study of prejudice. True, Bacon incidentally touched upon the subject in his "Novum Organum" under the title *Idola*, but his treatise in the interest of inductive logic can hardly be called a psychology of prejudice. Novelists, who are sometimes excellent psychologists, have also studied the theme, but rather in the synthetic way of art than in the analytic way of science.

The reason for these omissions cannot be that the subjects are too difficult, or unworthy of study, for psychologists have busied themselves with more difficult and less interesting topics. It must be the very commonness of the subjects. Science, it seems, has generated a tendency in her devotees to study only those things which are invisible to the naked eye. With telescope and microscope they go about discovering new facts, but like Thales they are constantly overlooking wells of knowledge that lie immediately before them. Prejudice, for example, because of its universality and ubiquity in the stream of consciousness, does not attract these psychologists' attention even while more obscure mental processes are being carefully teased and analyzed.

Another cause is the time-honored fallacy that "acquaintance with" is synonymous with "knowledge about;" that what is most common and familiar is best known, especially if its name has long been incorporated in our working vocabularies. Nietzsche has well said: "Wherever primitive man put up a

¹ L. B. Hellenbach, "Die Vorurtheile der Menschheit."

word, he believed that he had made a discovery. How utterly mistaken he really was! He had touched a problem, and while supposing that he had solved it, he had created an obstacle to its solution. Now, with every new knowledge we stumble over flint-like and petrified words, and, in so doing, break a leg sooner than a word." Everyone is acquainted with prejudice, if not from personal experience, at least from observation of others, but few have given the subject sufficient thought to have knowledge about it. Such knowledge, however, is important, and should be disseminated, especially among the young, because of its great ethical value.

It was said that prejudice is universal and ubiquitous. Taken literally, this statement may be difficult to substantiate, but allowing ourselves a little poetic license we might go even so far as to speak of a cosmic prejudice in the sense in which philosophers prate of a cosmic consciousness; in other words, we might maintain that this psychic flaw runs through the whole warp of the universe. Indeed, we unconsciously do this whenever we personify nature, and speak of her likes and dislikes, as her abhorrence of a vacuum, her favorite ways of accomplishing results, her ultimate purposes with regard to that particular species of animal called man, etc. The late Mr. Davidson took Professor James to task when the latter spoke of "the order of Nature" as mere *weather*, "doing and undoing without end," contending that "even the weather reveals an harmonious spiritual intent, in that it contributes to the development of spiritual beings by supplying their bodies with food."²

But whether nature be prejudiced or not, whether her "spiritual intent" be "conscious purpose" or "immanent teleology" (this the metaphysicians must settle among themselves) it is certain that the creators of nature, the gods of the various peoples, from the earliest, most primitive times down to the present, have had their prejudices without number. Even Jehovah, the god of a people relatively high in the stage of religious development, had strong prejudices against all who

² INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. VI, p. 233, 1895-6.

were not fortunate enough to be born of His chosen tribes. Indeed, an unbiased god would not be worshiped or prayed to, for he would have no personality, no individuality, no human attributes, and be as abstract and colorless as law, or being, or the absolute, which no people have ever truly worshiped. Now all living things which have individuality and personality are limited, and biased by reason of their limitations; which is as true of anthropomorphic, personal gods as of men and the lower animals. Whatever is limited is separated and in a measure alienated from all external to it. The skin, for example, forever sets off and separates that which is within from the rest of the external world, and the organism thus bounded reacts not to the whole external universe, but only to those few scattered bits of it which possess that which the organism needs for its sustenance and development, and for which it has the proper receptive organs. To the remaining fullness of the universe the little organism is dead. The world of the amoeba for example, while amply sufficient for its needs, is infinitely smaller and simpler than that of the dog; and that of the dog proportionately smaller and simpler than the universe of man. But even man, with his wonderfully developed nervous system and its end organs, cannot respond to all the forces of nature, nor know it in all its fullness. The organ for vision, for example, can only respond to luminiferous vibrations of from four hundred million millions to eight hundred million millions per second; the auditory organ responds only to air vibrations of from eight per second to forty thousand per second; and the skin is unable to recognize as separate touches, taps more than ten per second, or feel a weight of less than two milligrams on the forehead, and fifteen milligrams on the inner surface of the fingers. There is left, then, a whole world of vibrations and specific energies and an almost infinite variety of possible sensations, which are unknown to us because we lack the organs to receive them. Going from the sensory to the border line of the psychical realm, we find there similar limitations, such as the different preferences for colors, geometrical figures, sounds, tastes, touches, and odors. The thought we wish here to emphasize is that the minds, or, better,

the nervous systems of the newborn, animal as well as human, are not indifferent, impartial *tabulæ rasæ*, but are active, creative, and to a large extent "set" by very many more or less developed instincts and tendencies inherited from immediate and remote ancestors, which determine not only what impressions shall be received and what rejected, but also in what manner they shall be received, and what reactions, mental and physical, they shall call forth. We recreate the universe, each in his own limited, imperfect way, and no two are exactly alike.

But we must leave this wider consideration of the subject, interesting as it is for speculation, and limit ourselves to a study of prejudice in the sense in which it is more commonly understood, namely, as an *undue* prepossession in favor of, or against an object, being, or thought. Professor Patrick, while not attempting in an article on the subject to give an exact definition of prejudice, says, it is "an individual deviation from the normal beliefs of mankind, taking as the standard the universal, the general, or the mean."³ This limits him to prejudices of the intellectual type—to what may be called Noetic prejudices. But even within these narrow confines his statement will not hold, for it is equivalent to the now obsolete phrase, *Vox populi vox dei*, and the inference that those who do not subscribe to the *consensus gentium* are prejudiced heretics. According to this, Socrates, Jesus, Galileo, Bruno, Luther, Darwin, and a host of other reformers and innovators were prejudiced, which is manifestly absurd. Prejudice does not consist in deviating from a popular standard of any sort, but, as has been said, in an *undue* prepossession in favor of or against anything, be that what it may, a man, or his doctrine, or the color of his hair. It will be noticed that we do not limit prejudice to excessive antipathy, as is generally done, but make it include excessive propathy or predilection as well. Any inordinate reaction of the higher centres to an object is prejudice.

Here we must define the meaning of prepossession and determine when it becomes excessive or undue. To take the

³ "The Psychology of Prejudice," *Pop. Sci. Monthly*, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 633-643.

latter first: we certainly cannot maintain that prepossession is undue when it exceeds that of the people or the average man. The people have never been the criterion of truth, as history, especially the history of the warfare of science with theology, abundantly shows. The criterion is rather to be found within the individual himself, in the effect which his prepossession produces on his life and his general development as shown in his works and his daily conduct. If his prepossessions militate against his normal development mentally, morally, or physically, they are excessive and abnormal; if, on the other hand, they are conducive to further development, to a better *Aufklärung*, and to the discovery of truths which later generations will accept as such, they are productive of positive good and must be considered normal, regardless of the views of the people. As a rule, only time, "the final judge of appeal from the verdicts of successive ages," can determine whether or not an individual was justly considered prejudiced by his contemporaries, and not infrequently do we find one generation erecting costly monuments to the memory of those whom a previous generation burned at the stake or otherwise maltreated and dishonored.

Bearing this criterion of excess in mind, we may now take up the consideration of the psychological meaning of prepossession. In his study of prejudice Professor Patrick finds that it is but a popular name for that which is technically known as apperception. Prejudice, for him, is synonymous with apperception, and his article is consistently little more than a popular description and explanation of the latter. Once more we must take issue with our author. Prejudice is not apperception, but rather an arrest of it; a refusal or inability to apperceive. Apperception is a normal process by which the mind grows step by step and learns the unknown by means of the already known. So long as the apperceptive process is allowed to function normally, the individual develops and is in no danger of becoming prejudiced; it is only when the apperceptive process is arrested or interfered with that the danger arises. A little child sees an oblong watermelon and calls it a large pickle. This is apperception, but not prejudice. It would become prej-

udice if the child should insist on calling it a large pickle after it had been told that it was a watermelon; that is, if it should voluntarily arrest the normal apperceptive process. "Suppose," says Professor Patrick, "a plot of level ground in the suburbs of a city. A college student riding by apperceives it as a possible ball-ground; a young girl, as a tennis court; a speculator, as an addition for town lots; an undertaker, perhaps, as a possible site for a cemetery." ⁴ Here, again, there is no prejudice. The young girl, the speculator, and undertaker would be prejudiced if they should refuse to grant to the college student that the plot was also good for a ball-ground, and the college student would be prejudiced if he did not admit to the undertaker that it was suitable for a cemetery, provided, of course, that the plot was suitable for all four purposes. Apperception causes each to consider the ground from a particular point of view; prejudice disables them from considering it from any other point of view, even after it has been clearly pointed out. The point I wish to make clear is that apperception and prejudice are not synonymous, that the latter does not normally grow out of the former, but is only related to it negatively or contrarily. By prepossession, then, we mean disordered apperception; apperception that has been loaded, as it were; not pure apperception, but apperception in which there are unduly strong volitional and emotional ingredients. The unduly prepossessed individual either cannot or will not apperceive properly; he apperceives only as suits his purpose, which has been determined by his will and desire. Professor James shows this clearly in his essay on "The Will to Believe" ⁵ An hypothesis, he tells us, which is alive to an Arab is stone dead to a Christian; he simply will not entertain it for a moment. It does not fit in with his system of beliefs and theories, and therefore he immediately rejects it without stopping to examine its claims for his acceptance. That is, he willfully refuses to apperceive it properly in relation to his religious beliefs. This is true not only of the unlearned, but even of many who have been trained in logic and the exact methods

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 634.

⁵ N. Y., 1898.

of science. A leading biologist, writes Professor James, once said to him, "that even if such a thing (as telepathy) were true, scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of Nature, and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits."⁶ His interest in science prejudiced him against anything which threatened to overthrow its conclusions, even though that something were truer than his science. He could apperceive as science only facts of a certain order. Even Clifford, who at great length proves to us in his convincing style that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence," does so, as Professor James shows, in the interest of his anti-Christian doctrines. No evidence that a Christian could array would be considered sufficient by him. "Christianity is a dead hypothesis from the start." In other words, as the race has so truly said, "There are none so blind as those who will not see."

Here we see clearly the emotional and volitional roots of prejudice—roots which penetrate and ramify the whole soil of subconsciousness, vitiating our thinking and determining our attitude to the various phases of our environment. Were we passionless, without love or hate or fear or anger or desire or interest, we might coldly apperceive all things properly and be without prejudice. But Nature has not seen fit to evolve us thus; these emotions, desires, interests, and will-acts have proven necessary and valuable not only for our development from the lower forms of life, but for our continued development as human beings; for our commercial, industrial, political, even our scientific progress. But, what is normal and beneficial in a certain measure, becomes abnormal and injurious when that measure is deficient or excessive. "Error and evil are located in deficiency or excess. Even excess in virtue is evil, an excess of humility being abjectness; of courage, rashness; of prudence, cowardice; of patience, indifference; of economy, parsimony; of generosity, waste; of

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 10.

deference, obsequiousness. And so also an excess of learning is pedantry; of ease, idleness; of comfort, self-indulgence; of zeal, fanaticism. Right and justice are found in moderation—in the golden mean, in the true balance—between overdoing and underdoing, going too fast and too slow.”⁷ *Prejudice is located in deficiency or excess, and it is not a product of apperception*—this is our thesis.

What then is apperception? Many psychologists, even at the present day, are unable to rid themselves of the old “faculty psychology” conceptions, according to which the soul is a mosaic composed of separate bits of “sciousness,” differing in intensity, extensity, and quality, but belonging to one or the other of several well-marked modalities or faculties. The sum of all these bits of “sciousness” is *consciousness*. Accordingly, we have among other faculties the apperceiving faculty, with its numerous apperception-masses, which send out their tentacles, as it were, and seize all those objects or bits of “sciousness” within their reach for which they have the proper digestive organs. In this way a simple and beautiful system is wrought out, but like other things beautiful, it does not bear close inspection. It disintegrates the unity of the soul and makes it a compound composed of separate, distinct parts, instead of a combined effect of countless and subtle psycho-physical processes which are going on all the time. An effect is immediately materialized by these apperceptionists and associationists, and placed in the soul mosaic according to its modality. Thus we have love, fear, anger, hate, joy, wonder, awe, admiration, etc., which are but effects of psycho-physical processes, materialized into bits of “sciousness” and placed together in what may be called the emotional region of the soul. So, too, with percepts, concepts, images, ideas, longings, desires, actions, etc. They conceive of the soul, we repeat, as a mosaic, and not as an ever flowing stream fed by many tributaries and rivulets, and colored and intrinsically affected by the nature of the soil through which these pass. Apperception, according to them, is a dis-

⁷ Orlando J. Smith, “Balance, the Fundamental Verity,” p. 43.

tinct mental process, an agent functioning in its own, definite, machine-like way whenever an appropriate stimulus is given. Holding these views, it is readily seen why prejudice is confused with apperception. A man is prejudiced because the apperception-masses which he has accumulated in his lifetime react partially and unfavorably to a given idea or situation. Thus the undertaker's apperception-masses compel him to see in a plot of ground a suitable cemetery site; the girl's, a tennis court; the college student's, a ball-ground; and the speculator's an addition for town lots. But this, as was said in the beginning, is not prejudice; it is normal apperception. It may lead to an erroneous, partial view of things, but not necessarily to prejudice. Apperception, as we understand it, is an instinctive judgment of resemblance between a given object and similar objects previously experienced in a definite *milieu*. The undertaker sees in the plot of ground a cemetery because it is similar to other plots which he has known as cemeteries. For the college student the plot is similar to baseball grounds he has known, and so on for the others. The judgment is logical and correct within the limits of the experiences of each. But in prejudice, the judgment is neither correct nor logical even within the above limits; it is willfully warped and, as a rule, in spite of one's better reason. Apperception is simply an economical mode of psychical adjustment to environment in light of past experience. The child learning that a certain quadruped is called "horse," applies the same name to a similar quadruped, adding that it has horns in like manner. The emotions and will develop; that is to say, past feelings and volitions determine the nature of present feelings and will-acts as much as past ideas determine the nature of present ones.

In prejudice, on the other hand, there are instinctive, tendential, habitual, associational, emotional, and volitional ingredients which distort and vitiate the reason, and prevent a proper adjustment to a situation. Not a partial, erroneous judgment, therefore, due to limited experience, but a willful perversion of judgment because of interest and passion—love, hate, anger, jealousy, envy—is prejudice.

Again, in apperception resemblance is the great factor; in

prejudice it is difference. To see a resemblance between the anthropoid apes and man is normal apperception; to refuse to see it after it has been pointed out in detail and to magnify the points of difference is prejudice. Normal apperception leads to critical judgment and the discovery of scientific facts; the essence of prejudice is, as has been said, uncritical and biased judgment. Apperception appropriates the similar; prejudice rejects the different. Nay, it is the nature of prejudice to see difference where it does not exist, and to refuse to see resemblance when it does not suit its purpose. It is its strong emotional-volitional character which vitiates judgment and impels conduct that differentiates prejudice from apperception.

Let us now apply this criterion of excess and deficiency due to passion and will to each of the different types of prejudice and see how it works. Being a Caucasian I might personally be opposed to miscegenation, but if I should hold that miscegeny is bestial and a heinous crime I would be prejudiced for I would be deliberately overlooking all the resemblances between the colored and white races and be magnifying the differences out of all proportion. So, too, if my hatred of the negro were so intense that "I could not possibly imagine Othello as black" (so wrote a Southern authoress). "Frenchmen," Coleridge said, "are like grains of gunpowder: each by itself smutty and contemptible, but mass them together and they are terrible indeed!" Johnson referred to Americans as "a race of convicts who ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging." He was "willing to love all mankind, *except an American.*" Is this faulty apperception or prejudice? My love for my relatives may lead me to consider them beautiful and brilliant and magnanimous; but I should be prejudiced if I insisted that no one else could possibly be as good, or if confronted with sufficient evidence of their guilt I should still believe them innocent. The same is true of matters pertaining to the self. I cannot be expected to take the same interest in others as in myself and mine, but if I think that I am the only person worthy of the name "man," or that the universe was created and moves for me alone, and will

not recognize the rights and merits of others, I am prejudiced. I may prefer to mingle with people in my own social class, but to refuse to associate with others because they belong to a higher or lower level of society, or to consider them "unclean," as is done in India, is to be prejudiced. "At a town called Buj Buj (India) a widow lost caste by falling in love with a man beneath her. As a loss of caste by one member of the family degrades the others also, her eldest son immediately swallowed poison and died, and his remaining brethren fled the country." In justice to the Indians it should be said that not all Brahmins live in Asia. According to the proverbs of the European peoples, woman is mentally inferior to man, deceptive, cunning, vain, conceited, quarrelsome, mischievous, dishonest, untruthful, garrulous, fickle, etc. The proverbs show prejudice in that they are all stated as universal propositions. My ideas of beauty and a Chinaman's do not coincide. He speaks with contempt of our white teeth, which remind him of a dog's, and our rosy color is like that of a potato flower. But I should be prejudiced if I said he had no conception of beauty. A cowboy or miner who condemns a man because of his starched collar is as prejudiced as he who looks with contempt upon them because of their flannel shirts and coarse boots. I may be a devout Christian and believe Christianity to be the highest and truest development of religion, but to maintain that all other religions are superstitious or works of the devil is to be prejudiced. About the middle of the seventeenth century, when the City Council of Halle in Wurtemberg gave some privileges to a Jewish physician on account of his admirable experience and skill, "the clergy of the city joined in a protest, declaring that 'it were better to die with Christ than to be cured by a Jew doctor aided by the devil.'" Personally, I may be opposed to divorce, but I must be prejudiced to maintain that divorces are immoral, or that marriage under civil law only is concubinage, as the Archbishop of Valencia has just said. Such prejudices easily lead to riots.

The case of Ingres, a classicist artist of the first half of the nineteenth century who excluded Shakespeare and Goethe from

the gathering of great men around the Father of Poetry because he suspected them of Romanticism, is paralleled in literature by the intense prejudice of Carlyle against Scott because of his florid and descriptive style.

I may be a Hegelian, but I should be prejudiced did I refuse to see the truth in Humanism or the other systems of philosophy. One of the best cases of scholastic prejudice is that of Agassiz, who to his dying day fought with all the strength of his learning the theory of evolution. A Westerner recently declined a nomination to an office because he could not, as he said, be a politician and a Christian at the same time, and he preferred to be the latter. He was prejudiced against politicians, and implied that no politician can be a Christian, which is manifestly false. A Southerner should be proud of the glorious history of his people, but if he dubs all Northerners "carpetbaggers," can see nothing good in them, and hates the very word "North," he is prejudiced. I may be a Democrat, but if my partisan spirit prevents me from listening to the arguments of a Republican, I am prejudiced. The small merchant or laborer who can see nothing but unmitigated evil in trusts is prejudiced, as are trusts when they fail to recognize the just claims of the former. I may respect the ancients, but if I hold that the modern world is in every respect inferior to the ancient I am as prejudiced as he who holds that there is nothing good in the ancients. Finally, he who would refuse his daughter in marriage to a tailor or a shoemaker because of his trade is prejudiced. Such a one should remember that, to mention only two, Jacob Boehme, the German Plato, was a shoemaker, and President Andrew Johnson a tailor.

To conclude, our study shows that apperception is a process of interpreting present experiences in the light of past ones, and that within the limits of one's experience it is true and logical. It shows also, in an indirect way, that truth is ever growing and developing, that it is dynamic and a matter of individual psycho-physics, *i. e.*, human. It may be only a partial truth, or true only for me, that I cannot help being but a fallible mortal. It satisfies my needs, and therefore I shall hold to it until I find something better. But I am not blind to

the fact that others may, because of their different minds and bodies, apperceive and react to the world in ways totally different from mine. Indeed, I believe that each one lives in a world of his own, in which there are truths not to be found in any other. I recognize with the poet that:

"There are nine and sixty ways
Of composing tribal lays
And every single one of them is right."

and I try to follow Tennyson's counsel, to "take for God's truth that which harmonizes with all the best you know and helps and strengthens you in nobility of life."

Furthermore, I realize with Bacon that "the human intellect is not of the nature of a dry light, but receives a tincture from the will and affections; which generates accordingly knowledge *ad quod vult* (according to its own wishes), for what a man would rather was true, that he more readily believes. And so it rejects what is difficult, being impatient of inquiry; what is sober, for it straightens hope; the deeper things of nature, for it is superstitious; the light of experience, for it is arrogant and proud, and fears lest the mind should seem to be employed on vile and floating subjects; paradoxes, because it dreads the opinion of the vulgar; finally, in innumerable ways, and those sometimes imperceptible, the affection tinges and affects the intellect."⁸

It is, indeed, natural to be prejudiced, and requires the highest mental and moral development to overcome the tendency, for it necessitates an elimination of the personal equation in matters frequently of the greatest importance and interest to us. But no one will deny that we should strive at least to attain this development. It is characteristic of those who are prejudiced the most that they not only lack high mental and moral development, but have little desire to attain it. They are self-complacent in their error and ignorance. For them, truth is something noumenal, absolute, static, which they and those like them alone possess; all others walk in darkness and

⁸ Bacon's "Novum Organum," translated by G. W. Kitchin, Oxford, 1855, p. 24.

sin. There can be nothing true for one age or individual or condition, and false for others. Truth is eternal, perfect, divine. It is an entity, as the soul was once thought to be; not a condition growing out of an individual's relationship to his social and physical environment. It is to be found not within the individual, but in the far-distant realms of space with the aid of an abstracting telescope which excludes from view everything else in the universe except that which it is seeking and is interested in.

Apperception is constantly correcting its errors, accommodating itself to new conditions, appropriating new facts, and so developing. Prejudice is perfect *a priori*, has no errors to correct, and therefore compels or attempts to compel new conditions and new facts to accommodate themselves to it. Apperception waits upon time and makes trial; prejudice annihilates time and denies trial. Apperception broadens and liberates; prejudice arrests, narrows, and enslaves. The difference between the two, in a word, is the difference between the true and the false, the good and the evil, the beautiful and the ugly.

Nothing has thus far been said of the age at which prejudice first shows itself, nor of the sexual differences with regard to it, for the reason that there is no data on these points. Of a somewhat similar feeling, jealousy, it is known that it appears very early in the life of the child; some having seen manifestations of it in the third month, and many in the twelfth and fifteenth months.⁹ Perhaps organic prejudice, which the lower animals share with man, appears equally as early, but it is impossible that psychical prejudice should appear before the child has become self-conscious and capable of perceiving differences as well as resemblances, nor can it have obtained a high degree of development before adolescence. Prejudice requires for its existence a rather full development of the will and the emotions and not an inconsiderable development of the intellect. It is a psychical weed which crops out after the flowers have begun to blossom. In

⁹ See Arnold L. Gesell, "Jealousy," *Am. Jour. Psych.*, Oct., 1906, Vol. XVII, pp. 437-496.

our artificial and somewhat abnormal state of society, however, its seeds are planted very early by adults, as when wealthy parents refuse to allow their children to play with those of their poorer neighbors or with children of foreign birth or parentage. Becky and Irene were three-year-old playmates, constantly together. When Irene attended Sunday school for the first time, she heard the story of the Crucifixion of Christ and the part the Jews played in that tragedy. That afternoon, Becky went over as usual to play with her. "I shan't play with you any more," was Irene's angry greeting. "Why?" asked Becky, much astonished and hurt. "Because you killed my Christ." "I didn't kill him," protested Becky, frightened by the terrible charge. "Well, your mamma killed him." "No, my mamma didn't kill him, and I didn't kill him." "Well, I don't care, your boarder killed him," and with that she turned on her heels, leaving Becky to solve for herself as best she could the moral problem, why she should be held accountable for her mother's boarder's crime.

The aim of education, we say, is to develop broad and healthy-minded citizens, but how can this be done when parents and teachers poison the minds of the little ones as soon as they can understand and think? Child study is laying bare the developing soul of the child; the science of pedagogy is evolving new methods and offering new subjects of study, but it should never be forgotten that education is more than mere instruction; it is character-building, and to do this effectively we need an ethics for parents and teachers, a new decalogue perhaps, to be placed on every teacher's desk and over every child's crib. Here a pessimist might object that education, instead of being a remedy for prejudice, is the cause of it, pointing out that the higher animals, the child, and the savage have but few prejudices, while a civilized adult is capable of having every one of the prejudices just enumerated. There is a semblance of truth in this contention. But education is not the cause of prejudice, the latter is rather a by-product of the former. In the process of development an organism becomes increasingly more complex and differentiated, permitting in the highest stages of an almost infinite variety of combinations

of elements. This gives rise to a greater possibility of disharmonious relationship between the various elements, which in the last analysis is the cause of prejudice. Our voluntaristic psychology teaches us that consciousness is motor; that is, every state of consciousness is dynamic, and while we may not hope ever to be able to determine the value of each in some such terms as volts, ohms, and amperes of will and feeling, we know that they have them. Now it frequently happens that an idea or other state of consciousness has, because of frequent repetition, association, vividness, recency, or other circumstance, acquired more than its normal share of dynamic energy. Mental activity becomes polarized, as it were, around one or several ideas instead of being properly proportioned among all. In extreme cases—religious fanatics, ascetics, and mystics, for example—there is only one pole, and this condition is technically known as mono-ideaism. Here lies the secret of the almost superhuman power wielded by fanatics and ascetics. They put all their concentrated energies behind one idea, whereas the well-rounded, liberal man has his energies dissipated among his very many ideas and is unable to generate sufficient enthusiasm for any one to make it prevail over the others. Arranging individuals according to a scale of ideas, we would have mono-, bi-, tri-ideaist, etc., until, passing by imperceptible gradations from the abnormal to the normal, we should reach the extremely prejudiced, the moderately prejudiced, and finally the broad-minded, liberal, and critical, each of whose states of consciousness has its proper emotional-volitional value. These are the highest products of a sane, broad, and liberal education. We have then this condition: mere richness of contents of consciousness gives rise to a greater possibility for prejudices to lurk in the mind—the uncultured adult living in a civilized community has more and stronger prejudices than a savage—but richness combined with harmony precludes such a possibility. The harmonious subordination of the parts to the whole forming a well organized hierarchy, what the Greeks called "*sophrosune*," is the ideal mental condition and the necessary foundation for true morality. To be temperate and plastic, to develop and be able to

readily adapt one's self to new ideas and conditions, is to be all that the prejudiced individual, with his narrowness and one-sidedness, his mental crystallization, bigotry, fanaticism, and intolerance, is not. And what determines whether a man shall be the one or the other are heredity, home influences, education, and environment.

JOSIAH MORSE.

CLARK UNIVERSITY.